Is Another U.S. Military Base Really Necessary in Okinawa?

Eighty years ago, the final ground battle of World War II engulfed the Okinawan islands. The Battle of Okinawa reduced much of the main island to ashes in brutal combat between Japanese and American forces, and over 200,000 lives were lost. In the decades that followed, the islands were requisitioned to serve American military interests — at enormous cost to the people who call them home.
Under U.S. occupation after the war, vast tracts of privately owned land on Okinawa Island were forcibly seized to build American bases. Even after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, these bases remained. They continue to operate today under the U.S.–Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which sharply limits the reach of Japanese law — not only on the bases, but also off-base whenever U.S. personnel are deemed to be “on duty.” This has allowed serious crimes and misconduct to go unpunished or inadequately addressed, further eroding local trust.

Currently, in just nine municipalities across central and southern Okinawa Island, U.S. military installations occupy about 6,593 hectares of land — roughly 22.5% of the area — cutting through towns and neighborhoods, dividing communities with barbed wire and restricted zones.　For eight decades, Okinawa has remained under a de facto military occupation. In defiance of this, its people have consistently voiced their opposition — most clearly in three successive gubernatorial elections (2014, 2018, and 2022), rejecting the construction of yet another base at Henoko.
Furthermore, in the prefectural referendum on Henoko held on February 24, 2019, with a turnout of 52.48%, a decisive 71.7% of voters — 434,273 people — cast ballots against the new base, while only 19.0% voted in favor. The will of the Okinawan people opposing the new base at Henoko could not have been clearer.
All municipalities in Okinawa united in opposition to the plan to build the base. Nevertheless, the Japanese government is forcing through construction, attempting to bury the coral reefs and seagrass beds of Henoko and Oura Bay — where over 5,300 species, including 262 endangered ones, have been identified. The project is destined to bury a globally significant marine ecosystem under 740 million cubic feet of landfill to create a new air base for the U.S. military.

This kind of environmental destruction threatens the habitat of marine life, including the dugong, an endangered species protected under both Japanese and U.S. law. Even according to the U.S. military’s own environmental regulations, such acts are prohibited.

The World’s Most Dangerous Base

Nearly 30 years have passed since the brutal incident in September 1995, when three U.S. Marines abducted and assaulted a 12-year-old Okinawan girl. In an effort to calm the outrage that erupted across Okinawa, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed in 1996 to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station — located in a densely populated residential area of Ginowan City — to Henoko, Nago City, claiming it was part of a broader initiative to reduce Okinawa’s base burden.
In November 2003, then–U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly described Futenma as “the most dangerous airfield in the world” during an aerial inspection of the site. Whether or not these were Rumsfeld’s exact words, they resonated with local residents, as the base fails to meet even the basic standards required under Japanese aviation law. Despite this, the U.S. military has continued to operate the base, located in the middle of a densely populated city of over 100,000 residents, with no meaningful safety measures put in place by either the Japanese or U.S. governments. Intense training by Marine Corps aircraft is carried out directly above residential areas, schools, and commercial zones, with helicopters and planes flying low overhead dozens of times each day. The noise is constant, and the danger of crashes looms — a threat that has been left unaddressed for decades.
On December 13, 2017, a U.S. Marine CH-53 helicopter’s emergency window fell into the playground of Futenma Daini Elementary School while around 50 children were in the middle of a physical education class. Just a week earlier, on December 6, a part from the same model of helicopter had fallen onto the roof of a nearby daycare center, where dozens of toddlers were playing. Both incidents had the potential to result in serious tragedy.
Futenma violates the safety standards mandated for U.S. military airfields within the United States. Yet, in the “Futenma Air Station Master Plan” prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1992, it was falsely claimed that a “clear zone” — required for safety — had been secured, even though elementary schools, homes, and some 3,600 residents were clearly located within that zone. This blatant falsehood remains the basis of the base’s ongoing operation.

Escalating Dangers Confirm the Warnings

As if to confirm Secretary Rumsfeld’s observations, a CH-53D heavy-lift helicopter took off from Futenma Air Station in August 2004 and crashed into the main building of Okinawa International University in Ginowan City. The aircraft burst into flames. Miraculously, no one was killed, but from that day onward, the constant threat of U.S. military helicopters and other aircraft crashing into civilian areas has haunted local residents.
In response to the crash, a massive citizens’ protest was held in September 2004,

drawing about 30,000 people demanding accountability and change.

But rather than abating, the dangers have only grown. Okinawan anger and distress have deepened, especially as the will of the people continues to be ignored.
In 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps announced it would deploy two squadrons — 24 MV-22 Ospreys — to Futenma, in spite of its perilous urban location. The aircraft are notorious for their accident history, extreme noise, and low-frequency vibrations that harm human health. In September 2012, 100,000 Okinawans gathered for a prefecture-wide demostration opposing the deployment. Despite this, residents were ignored, and one month later, 12 Ospreys were deployed. Another 12 followed in 2013, bringing the full 24 aircraft into operation.These Ospreys now fly over Okinawan neighborhoods daily, often until 11 p.m., heedless of the public outcry. On December 13, 2016, one of the aircraft crashed on the shoreline of Nago City’s Abu district during a nighttime aerial refueling drill.

Back in 1996, the Japanese and U.S. governments justified the Henoko relocation by claiming that the Marines could not be moved out of Okinawa. But in later bilateral agreements in 2005 and 2012, the two governments agreed to relocate 9,000 Marines and their 9,000 family members to Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. As part of this realignment, the Japanese government funded and constructed Camp Blaz, a new U.S. Marine Corps base on Guam which came into operation in 2024, and includes headquarters buildings and barracks. At Andersen Air Force Base, aircraft parking areas and hangars for the Marines have been finished, along with live-fire training ranges. Additional joint training facilities are being built on Tinian Island in the Northern Marianas. In Apra Harbor on Guam, new naval piers and medical facilities are also being developed for the Marines. In Hawaii, facilities to receive Marines from Okinawa are scheduled for completion by 2028. Even Futenma’s aviation units are slated to relocate along with the Marines. In other words, it is abundantly clear that the construction of a new base at Henoko is no longer necessary.

Okinawa’s Future — Democracy or U.S.–Japan Military Authoritarianism?

In 1996, the Japanese and U.S. governments attempted to suggest the new base would be an unobtrusive ‘heliport’: temporary, small-scale and located offshore.  But by 2005, that plan had morphed into something entirely different — a massive new military base, involving the reclamation of Oura Bay and the construction of two full-length runways. The area to be filled is so vast it could swallow up the equivalent of 8,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Although local opposition to Henoko base construction began as far back as 1996, it was in 2014 that the Okinawan people sent their most powerful message yet to both the Japanese and U.S. governments.
In January 2014, Nago City mayor Inamine Susumu — who opposed the Henoko relocation — was reelected by a wide margin. Then, in November 2014, former Naha City mayor Onaga Takeshi, who strongly opposed the Henoko project, defeated incumbent governor Nakaima Hirokazu, who had caved to government pressure and accepted the relocation. That year’s gubernatorial race became, in effect, a referendum on the Henoko plan. Even in Ginowan City — the community most directly impacted by the dangers of Futenma — Onaga defeated Nakaima by a wide margin. The following month, in the December 2014 general election, candidates opposed to the Henoko base plan won in all four of Okinawa’s single-seat districts. For years, opinion polls have consistently shown that 65% to 80% of Okinawans oppose the construction. And yet, the Japanese government ignored these democratic expressions of the people’s will and carried on regardless. From the summer of 2014, workboats began offshore operations in Henoko, initiating underwater boring surveys. In response, citizens opposed to the base began a sit-in protest at the gate of Camp Schwab, and also launched sea-based protests. Nevertheless, the government forcibly removed protesters and proceeded with full-scale land reclamation work in Henoko and Oura Bay.

Governor Onaga’s Last Battle: A Legacy of Courage to Challenge Government Overreach

Governor Onaga, elected in November 2014 on a firm anti-Henoko platform, committed himself fully to representing the will of the Okinawan people. On July 16, 2015, a third-party expert panel reported that the original landfill permit granted by his predecessor should be revoked due to legal defects. Onaga then entered a month-long period of intensive talks with the Japanese government, but no compromise was reached. On October 13, Onaga held a press conference to announce the formal revocation of the permit to reclaim land at Henoko. In response, the central government countered by invoking the Administrative Complaint Review Act — a legal mechanism meant to protect individual citizens — and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism suspended Onaga’s revocation. The state then initiated a lawsuit culminating in a Supreme Court ruling against Okinawa’s position. In April 2017, the government began construction of the seawalls. During subsequent boring surveys, it was revealed that the planned landfill zone in Oura Bay contains  soft seabed, requiring extensive ground reinforcement.

On July 27, 2018, Onaga again initiated proceedings to revoke approval for construction, this time citing three reasons:

1. The presence of soft seabed at the proposed site.
2. Inadequate environmental measures regarding coral and other species.
3. Insufficient consultation with Okinawa Prefecture before starting construction.

Just twelve days later, on August 8, 2018, Onaga, who had been suffering from advanced pancreatic cancer, passed away. He had prioritized the withdrawal of the landfill permit over his own health and lived just long enough to ensure that the revocation process was set in motion. Following Onaga’s instructions, Okinawa’s vice governor finalized the revocation on August 31. Onaga’s act was not only political; it was deeply personal and courageous — a fulfillment of his campaign pledge, even at the cost of his life.
In the subsequent September 30 gubernatorial election, Tamaki Denny, who pledged to continue Onaga’s anti-base legacy, won decisively, and inherited the legal struggle against the Henoko construction. Yet again, the central government used the same legal tactics as before. It filed another complaint under the Administrative Complaint Review Act, resulting in the suspension and eventual cancellation of Okinawa’s revocation.

In April 2020, the Ministry of Defense submitted a “Landfill Plan Modification Request”, seeking approval for significant changes to the project due to the issue of soft seabed. On November 25, 2021, Okinawa Prefecture rejected the request, citing:

1. No legitimate reason for the modification.
2. Inadequate geological and engineering surveys to justify the need.
3. The plan failed to meet land-use appropriateness and rationality requirements.
4. Environmental concerns, including inadequate protection of dugongs and marine biodiversity.

Nonetheless, on December 26, 2023, the Ministry of Land and Infrastructure, acting as both judge and interested party, unilaterally approved the modified plan through “substitute execution” — once again evading democratic accountability for its actions.  Rather than serving as a check on government power, the legal system was exploited to facilitate inter-ministerial collusion — with the Ministry of Land and Infrastructure effectively rubber-stamping a request from the Ministry of Defense.

Unstable Seabed, Risky Engineering, and Ballooning Costs

Okinawa Prefecture’s refusal to approve the revised landfill plan was based on concrete technical grounds. In particular, the prefecture pointed to the absence of critical geotechnical data at the most important point in the construction plan: the B-27 area near Seawall C.  At this site, soft seabed continues as deep as 90 meters below sea level, but the national government did not conduct the necessary shear strength tests at this crucial location. Instead, it extrapolated values from tests conducted 150, 300, and even 750 meters away — a method Okinawa flatly rejected, stating that the data “cannot be said to appropriately reflect the characteristics of the B-27 area.”                Moreover, the Sand Compaction Pile (SCP) method proposed for ground improvement has only ever been used successfully at depths of up to 70 meters. That would leave about 20 meters of untreated, ultra-soft seabed below the reinforced layer. Experts warn that this could compromise the stability of the reclaimed land, especially since the government’s estimates rely on theoretical shear strength values rather than actual data.  A group of civil engineering researchers has also warned that the proposed reclamation site at Henoko sits atop extremely soft, waterlogged seabed — often described as “mayonnaise-like” — which may be prone to collapse during or after construction. Alarmingly, their analysis suggests that even low-magnitude earthquakes — between magnitude 1 and 3 — could destabilize the ground. While Okinawa is not among Japan’s most seismically active regions, the risk is compounded by the fragile condition of the seabed, raising the possibility of structural failure, environmental destruction, and danger to human life should construction proceed as planned.

These issues have predictably led to ballooning costs. Originally estimated at ¥350 billion, the project’s cost was later revised to ¥930 billion — nearly triple the initial figure. But even this revised estimate is now outdated. Okinawa Prefecture’s own projections suggest that total costs could exceed ¥2.5 trillion, or over 50 times the cost of a comparable land-based facility.  Given the complex and unstable geology of the site — with seabed depths reaching up to 90 meters in parts of Oura Bay, and significant variation in the ground layers — the reclaimed land is likely to sink unevenly and collapse in places. Even the Ministry of Defense has admitted that there is no precedent in Japan for stabilizing seabed at such depths. Experts warn that this makes the site fundamentally unsuitable for supporting a runway.  As a result, the question arises as to whether this project is really about collective security or the enormous profits tied to endless construction and landfill contracts.

The Daily Toll of Aircraft Noise from U.S. Bases

Among the many burdens imposed by the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, aircraft noise pollution stands out as a constant and severe affliction. Even after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, the Japanese government has continued to maintain the U.S. bases, while the U.S. military operates them much as it did under the occupation. Under the U.S.–Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Japanese domestic law does not apply within the bases, granting the U.S. military near-total autonomy. Yet the fences that surround these bases do nothing to contain the deafening noise of fighter jets overhead. The boundaries are clearly marked on the ground — but the sound knows no borders.
In contrast to standards that exist in the United States to protect residents living near military installations, Okinawans receive no such legal protections. As a result, people living near Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station continue to endure deafening noise pollution from repeated flight training exercises.
Currently, around 35,000 plaintiffs have joined the fourth round of lawsuits against Kadena Air Base, and around 5,000 plaintiffs are pursuing the third round against Futenma. In all previous lawsuits — three for Kadena and two for Futenma — Japanese courts have acknowledged the illegality of the noise and ordered the government to pay damages.
But monetary compensation is not enough. What’s needed is the immediate cessation of night flights and a drastic reduction in flight training over residential areas.

The Recurrence of Sexual Violence by U.S. Personnel — The Ongoing Burden of U.S. Bases in Okinawa

According to statistics from the Okinawa Prefectural Government, between the 1972 reversion and the end of 2023, there were 6,235 criminal cases involving U.S. military personnel or related individuals. Of these, 586 were classified as serious crimes — including murder, robbery, and rape — and 80 were sex crimes such as indecent assault.  Between 1989 and 2023, of the 88 reported cases of rape by U.S. personnel across Japan, 41 occurred in Okinawa — or 46.5% of the total. Of the 75 cases of indecent assault, 27 occurred in Okinawa.   Moreover, according to local civil society research, since the 1945 U.S. invasion of Okinawa, an estimated 1,000 sexual violence cases attributable to U.S. military personnel have occurred within the prefecture, with approximately 900 female victims. These are likely underestimates, as the stigma surrounding sexual violence — especially in a militarized context — prevents many survivors from coming forward. The true number of cases is assumed to be at least double what is documented. Two recent incidents underscore the continuing danger faced by Okinawan civilians. In 2016, in Uruma City, 20-year-old Rina Shimabukuro left her apartment for a routine evening walk. She was later abducted, brutally raped, strangled, and stabbed by a former U.S. Marine working as a military contractor. Her body was found nearly three weeks later in a wooded area in Onna Village’s Afuso district, about 10 km from where she disappeared. The atrocity shocked the community and reignited widespread outrage over the U.S. military presence. In 2023, a U.S. Air Force member was arrested for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a girl under the age of 16 at his off-base residence. Following the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. Marines, the Japanese and U.S. governments introduced a “notification system” in 1997. This system was intended to facilitate timely communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Okinawa Defense Bureau, and local authorities whenever a serious incident involving U.S. personnel occurred. But recent cases have revealed that even when service members are arrested and indicted for rape, the Okinawa prefectural government is not informed in a timely manner, or not informed at all. Despite the 1997 agreement, the notification system is not functioning properly.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has claimed this was done to “protect the privacy of the victim,” but in reality, arbitrary implementation has allowed incidents to be concealed, exposing Okinawan communities — particularly women — to continued danger. This failure to act with transparency and urgency reflects a disregard for gender-based harm and a deeper failure to take the prevention of sexual violence seriously.

In October 2024, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued a recommendation to the Japanese government (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/9). It expressed concern about the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and the sexual violence committed by service members, urging Japan to take concrete steps to prevent gender-based violence, investigate and prosecute perpetrators, impose adequate punishment, and ensure sufficient compensation for survivors.
Protest rallies and citizen assemblies continue to be held in Okinawa. Public anger remains deep and widespread. The Japanese government must take the CEDAW recommendations seriously and act swiftly to implement meaningful countermeasures against sexual violence committed by U.S. military personnel.

Missile Bases and War Preparations — The Threat to Okinawa’s Islands

Since 2016, the Japanese government has pursued a six-year plan to construct Self-Defense Forces (SDF) missile and radar bases across Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyu archipelago, deploying multiple new units in the process. These developments have sparked deep concern among local residents that the islands may once again be transformed into battlegrounds.
Officially described as preparation for a “Taiwan contingency,” this latest wave of military escalation relies on a term as vague as it is dangerous. The euphemism conceals what is, in effect, a deliberate strategy to turn the islands between Kyushu and Taiwan into an undeclared war zone. By normalizing the idea of a future conflict over Taiwan, Japanese and U.S. planners are laying the groundwork for preemptive attacks and a devastating regional war. Okinawan communities — long treated as expendable — are once again being positioned as a sacrificial pawn.
Yet despite widespread local opposition, the government has pressed forward — first deploying short-range (200–300 km) “defensive” missiles, and then, in a major policy shift in 2022, committing to long-range missiles capable of striking neighboring countries up to 1,600 kilometers away. Deployment of these missiles is now scheduled to begin next spring.
The government has also quietly developed civilian evacuation plans under which entire island populations would be relocated to Kyushu in the event of hostilities. Okinawans are acutely aware of what this means: Tokyo and Washington are preparing for war — and once again designating Okinawa as the frontline.
Joint military exercises involving the SDF and U.S. forces have already begun, focusing heavily on the Ryukyu and Amami Islands. In response, Okinawan citizens launched protest actions in 2023, including a large prefecture-wide rally rejecting the remilitarization of their homeland. These efforts continue.
As we mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the Battle of Okinawa, humanity faces a stark choice: a just and lasting peace — grounded in fairness, compassion, and international cooperation — or yet more reckless and destructive military escalation. Having lost 120,000 of our fellow islanders — a quarter of Okinawa’s population at the time — to the barbarism unleashed during that war, we feel a profound obligation to ensure that Okinawa is never again used as Japan’s — or anyone else’s — sacrificial pawn.
For eight decades, Okinawans have lived with the memory of war and the weight of occupation, fostering a deep revulsion toward the prospect of new bases and new wars. In a world descending into new forms of barbarism, Okinawa continues to seek common cause with those who yearn for — and demand — a peaceful future grounded in justice, dignity, and a shared humanity.